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WASTE AND LONGING — THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF PLACENTAL-BLOOD 
BANKING
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
ASTE is not always what it seems. In his
Cold War novel Underworld, for example,
Don DeLillo explores the multifaceted
qualities of waste. “Waste,” he notes, “is the secret
history, the underhistory, the way archaeologists dig
out the history of early cultures, every sort of bone
and broken tool, literally from under the ground.”1
And waste can also be transformed into money:
They are trading garbage in the commodity pits in Chicago.
They are making synthetic feces in Dallas. You can sell
your testicles to a firm in Russia that will give you four
thousand dollars and then remove the items surgically and
mash them up and extract the vital substances and market
the resulting syrupy stuff as rejuvenating beauty cream, for
a profit that is awesome.1 
It is probably a rare (and desperate) person who
would sell his testicles, and it seems at least as strange
to try to sell a baby’s placental blood (also termed
umbilical-cord blood) to the newborn’s mother by
charging her for collecting and storing it. What makes
this waste product of childbirth suddenly valuable to
both parents and the public? The answer is that pla-
cental blood has gained new status as a natural re-
source, a potential source of hematopoietic stem cells
for patients who would otherwise require a bone
marrow transplant. With this new status have come
new marketing strategies, as for-profit and not-for-
profit corporations seek the cooperation of hospitals
and obstetricians, and the consent of pregnant wom-
en, for the collection, storage, and use of placental
blood.
Study of the ethical issues regarding placental-
blood banking has been ongoing.2-5 New evidence
of the value of placental blood means that it is also
time to examine the legal and social-policy issues re-
garding the collection, storage, and use of placental
blood, including the hidden dangers of commercial-
izing this “waste” product.
W
USES OF PLACENTAL BLOOD
In a study published in the Journal in 1998,
Rubenstein et al. concluded, on the basis of a study
of the outcomes among 562 recipients of placental-
blood transplants from unrelated donors, that “pla-
cental blood is a useful source of allogeneic hemato-
poietic stem cells for bone marrow reconstitution.”6
Allogeneic transplantation may be even better than
autologous transplantation in leukemia, since a graft-
versus-leukemia effect lessens the probability of re-
lapse.6,7 Many questions remain, but this large study
confirmed the usefulness of placental blood for treat-
ing a variety of conditions in unrelated recipients
and suggested that research may be warranted on its
use for solid cancers as well.7 The findings are likely
to encourage more rapid development of an already
fast-growing industry to collect and store placental
blood. A central policy issue is whether obstetricians
should encourage patients to choose the storage of
placental blood for their own use (by for-profit com-
panies), or to donate placental blood for the use of
others (through not-for-profit organizations).
THE PROPER ANALOGY
Placental blood is described as useful for the trans-
plantation of stem cells. This phrase implies that the
model of organ transplantation should be adopted
for the collection of placental blood.6,7 This similar-
ity is perhaps natural, because historically the trans-
plantation of bone marrow (the chief source of stem
cells) has itself been treated as analogous to organ
transplantation. For example, in Massachusetts, where
the first human kidney transplantation involving a
living, minor donor was performed in 1957, the treat-
ing hospital, Peter Bent Brigham, went to court to
obtain approval (and legal immunity from possible
charges of battery and negligence) for performing
surgery on the minor donor.8,9 Beginning in 1973,
when Boston hospitals began to use minor donors
as a source of bone marrow, they went to court for
permission, thus adopting the organ-transplantation
model with respect to the donor’s consent.10 Doing
so made some sense, because even though bone mar-
row is quickly replenished, the donor did have to un-
dergo general anesthesia, together with its risks. On
the other hand, the hospital lawyers could (more ap-
propriately, I believe) have used the analogy of blood
transfusion and avoided court approval altogether.
Whatever one thinks of using the organ-transplan-
tation model for the invasive procurement of bone
marrow, it makes sense to think of collecting placen-
tal blood as more closely akin to blood donation than
to organ donation. Unlike bone marrow donation
between siblings, for example, there is no potential
conflict of interest between the siblings, because the
collection of placental blood, which is usually done
before the placenta is delivered but after childbirth,
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involves no physical risk to the donor, either mother
or newborn.
Which model is chosen — blood donation or organ
transplantation — matters because the choice will
make some actions seem natural and even legally nec-
essary, and others seem simply wrong. The practices
that we have come to accept for blood collection
and transfusion are not the same as those we accept
for organ transplantation. For example, we take spe-
cial precautions to protect living organ donors from
harm, and we generally require that they have a close
family relation to the recipient in order to donate.
Likewise, we prohibit the purchase and sale of hu-
man organs because we think these practices put do-
nors at risk from potentially coercive monetary in-
ducements and also because we highly value the “gift
relationship” in organ transplantation as a rare and
praiseworthy example of altruism.11,12 Thus, if we
adopt the transplantation model for placental blood,
we are likely to focus on the risks to the donor and
forbid commerce and sales.
On the other hand, the transfusion analogy will
lead us to consider risks to the donor as minimal or
nonexistent, to consider commerce as possible, even
if not preferable, and to place our emphasis on en-
suring the safety of the blood itself before its use.13
Under the organ-donation model, when and if the
collection of placental blood seems medically rea-
sonable as a routine procedure, we might require
that obstetricians request permission to obtain it for
public blood banking. Similarly, we might require
obstetricians to inform their patients of the option
of personal banking if we adopt the blood-donation
model. This is similar to the way patients undergo-
ing elective surgery are informed about the option
of banking their own blood before the operation. In
my view, the organ-transplantation analogy is dysfunc-
tional and misleading. Adopting the blood-transfu-
sion analogy may help us more properly conceptual-
ize the real issues involved in the collection, storage,
and use of placental blood, even though this choice
may lead us to permit some commerce in placental
blood.11,13 The blood-donation model would also
put the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which
has jurisdiction over the safety of human blood, in
charge of regulating placental-blood safety. The FDA’s
proposed regulations have already been subjected to
critical legal commentary.14,15 
OWNERSHIP AND CONSENT
The most important and contentious issues in the
legal realm are the interrelated issues of ownership
and consent, privacy, and commercialism. The iden-
tity of the source (and thus the most likely owner)
of placental blood must be determined, because this
is the person who has the legal authority to consent
to its collection and use. As a matter of biologic and
genetic identity, placental blood can be said to be-
long to the newborn child. This is why it is often
used to screen the newborn for various conditions
and infections. Placental blood is also a waste product,
like the placenta itself. But now that value has been
discovered in this waste and recycling it increases its
value, any assumption that the owner has no interest
in it evaporates. In the case of the newborn (and the
newborn’s valuable waste products), the mother has
the right and responsibility to make decisions regard-
ing the child; she also has the right to make decisions
about the child’s property and medical treatment,
consistent with the child’s best interests. The consent
of both parents is not legally necessary.
Hospitals have the right to dispose of human tis-
sues (such as blood and placentas) in a manner con-
sistent with good hospital practice. When placental
blood was seen as a useless waste product of child-
birth, disposing of it in the same manner as other
human tissue that is considered waste was reason-
able.16 But once placental blood is identified as valu-
able, that value must be explained to the mother and
her permission obtained to use the placental blood
in the manner desired by the physician or the hospital.
This does not mean that the mother owns her child’s
placental blood; it seems most reasonable to consid-
er the child as the legal owner. But it does mean that
the mother has decision-making authority over the
disposition of placental blood, at least so long as her
choices are consistent with both reasonable medical
practice and her child’s welfare. That is why, although
it seems most reasonable to consider the child as the
donor and owner of placental blood, it has nonethe-
less seemed appropriate to consider the mother the
donor for the purposes of informed consent.3,6 
Fetal-tissue donation also provides a useful analogy
here. The woman does not own her dead fetus; but
she has more interest in its disposition than anyone
else. Accordingly, only she can consent to the use of
fetal tissues for research or therapy, and in the ab-
sence of her consent, the fetus must be buried, cre-
mated, or otherwise properly disposed of. It is gener-
ally suggested that the mother’s consent be sought
before abortion and ratified after abortion.17 In a re-
search protocol, the consent form and procedure must
also be approved by an institutional review board.2,3,6
The blood-donation model can help here as well, since
the use of the organ-transplantation model in fetal-
tissue research has put far too much emphasis on the
fetus itself as the tissue donor. The fetus, after all, is
not the research subject. Moreover, since the fetus is
dead, it cannot be harmed by the research. It is the
recipient of fetal tissue that is the research subject, and
emphasis should be placed on protecting the recipi-
ent–subject in fetal-tissue research, just as it should
be when placental blood is used in research.17 The re-
search subject is the recipient of placental blood; there
is no medical risk to the baby whose placental blood
is used, nor to the mother who consents to its use.
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PRIVACY
Although there are no physical risks in collecting
placental blood, there are significant risks to privacy.
If placental blood is used for research or therapy, it
must be screened for a variety of diseases, including
the human immunodeficiency virus, and probably
for at least some genetic disorders as well.3,6 In the
study by Rubenstein et al., for example, tests for
“hemoglobinopathies and other genetic diseases were
performed . . . on the basis of family history and
ethnic background.”6 If the placental blood is linked
to the donor, screening creates medical information
about the child and could disclose the otherwise
“secret history” of the mother as well. This leaves
two choices: either the mother’s consent to perform
the screening tests and create this medical information
must be obtained (and steps taken to inform her of
the test results and keep them confidential from
others), or the placental blood must be stripped of
all individual identifiers so that the blood cannot
be linked to its source. Consent and privacy are im-
portant issues for all so-called DNA data banks or
DNA-sample collections,18-20 not just placental-blood
banks.
Privacy is of special concern in collecting, testing,
and storing placental blood because the source of
the blood is a newborn. There is general agreement
that children should not be tested for genetic diseas-
es that will not manifest themselves until adulthood
and for which there is no preventive intervention or
treatment that, to be effective, must be commenced
before adulthood.18,21 It is possible that some addi-
tional useful information about the safety of the pla-
cental blood could be gained by following the child
as he or she develops. Nonetheless, such surveillance
seems both unlikely as a practical matter and poten-
tially dangerous to the child’s privacy. It has been
suggested that “linkability” in research projects in-
volving placental blood be maintained but that “ap-
propriate firewalls” be constructed to protect the
donor’s identity and privacy.3 But I believe that the
best policy for the storage of nonautologous placen-
tal blood, from the standpoint of privacy, is to re-
move all identifiers from the sample so that the
blood can be freely tested without simultaneously
testing the child and the mother. This policy would
also prevent recipients or their families from trying
to contact the donor for another donation if the ini-
tial donation is not successful. Physicians who want
to maximize the protection of their patients’ privacy
should advise them against donating placental blood
to a blood bank that retains patient identifiers.
COMMERCIALISM
Commercialism may affect placental-blood collec-
tion in two important ways. First, the physicians or
hospitals collecting the placental blood may want to
use it for their own purposes — for example, to try
to develop a commercially viable product or for a re-
search project. In either case, the physician has a fi-
duciary or trust obligation to inform the mother of
the research use itself, as well as the possible commer-
cial applications of the research, and to obtain her
consent to use the placental blood in this manner.21-23 
Second, for-profit companies market their services
directly to pregnant women, offering to store pla-
cental blood for a price. The advertising of most of
these companies is readily accessible though the In-
ternet. The direct-marketing approach raises the ob-
vious issues of truth in advertising and the possible
exploitation of patients at a particularly vulnerable
time in their lives. The frequently used term “bio-
logic insurance,” for example, is misleading, since
the probability that the placental blood will be of use
in a family with no history of blood disease ap-
proaches zero (approximately 1 in 20,000 for the
first 20 years of life). Moreover, one’s own stem cells
may be less effective in treatment than an unrelated
donor’s.6,24,25
A central legal question is the nature of the rela-
tion between the woman’s attending physician (who
must collect the blood or supervise its collection)
and the company. Is the physician, for example, act-
ing as an agent of the company (in which case the
company is also responsible for the physician’s ac-
tions and for any negligence) or as an independent
contractor (in which case the company is not re-
sponsible for the physician’s actions)? The companies
seem to want to treat the physician as an agent of
the patient. One company, Viacord, has used a con-
tract that asks the mother to sign an “informed con-
sent and release” form in which, in lengthy legalese,
she agrees (on the behalf of herself and her child and
everyone else) never to sue Viacord for anything. In
the research setting, such a waiver of rights violates
existing federal regulations. Even in the therapeutic
setting, where placental blood is being stored for
possible future use, no physician should be a party
to any medical procedure, including the collection
of placental blood on behalf of a patient, that re-
quires the patient to waive any of her rights to com-
petent, professional, and accountable care. To do so
is a violation of the physician’s fiduciary duty to the
patient.
Typical processing and storage charges by for-
profit companies are $1,500 initially, and $100 a
year thereafter. One company, Lifebank, has three
payment options — a one-time payment of $2,995
and two extended-payment plans with down pay-
ments of either $575 or $495 and periodic payments
thereafter. Some sperm and embryo banks have also
branched out into placental-blood banking. And busi-
ness is booming. A California company, Cord Blood
Registry, has stored more than 10,000 placental-
blood specimens in the past three years. This is more
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on November 17, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 1999 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
1524 · May 13, 1999
The New England Journal  of  Medicine
than the 8700 specimens the nonprofit New York
Blood Center in Manhattan has stored in its six years
of operation.24
Some placental-blood–storage firms have policies
that if the storage fees are not paid, the blood be-
comes the property of the company. Such policies
inappropriately treat placental blood like a pawned
watch. It is defensible to destroy a placental-blood
sample if the storage fees are not paid, the way fro-
zen embryos have sometimes been destroyed after
the couples who agreed to their creation and storage
abandon them. Embryos should never be used for
reproduction or research without the couple’s in-
formed consent. It seems reasonable, however, to per-
mit the storage facility to use the placental blood for
stem-cell research if it has been abandoned, at least if
privacy is protected by having all identifiers stripped
from the sample.18 Permitting the storage company
to sell the placental blood to others for therapeutic
use, on the other hand, would create conflicts be-
tween the storage facility and both the donor (who
benefits, if at all, only if the blood is retained in stor-
age) and the recipient (who would want records kept
of the donor even though the donors would not).
PLACENTAL-BLOOD BANKING
AND MARKET-BASED MEDICINE
As market-based medicine matures and efficiency
threatens to replace ethics as the touchstone of medi-
cal practice, we are likely to see more schemes to
transform medical waste into profit. As a form of re-
cycling, these are not necessarily bad, but unrestrained
by law such schemes undermine important values,
including autonomy and privacy. For placental blood,
the promise of future use, by a family without a his-
tory of a disease that hematopoietic cells could be
used to treat, seems unrealistic and deeply exploita-
tive of vulnerable new parents. In the short term, the
public will nonetheless probably consider placental-
blood storage just another option that consumers
can accept or reject as they see fit, at least as long as
they can pay for it. This is also how some physicians
will probably see it as well: another waste product
transformed into gold. Of course, the source of this
gold could change quickly if a method is developed
to expand pluripotent hematopoietic stem cells in vi-
tro,7 so that virtually limitless supplies of stem cells
could be created from a few progenitor cells. Until
that time, however, the legal and policy issues in pla-
cental-blood banking must be faced.
There is a serious shortage of matched bone mar-
row for transplantation, and public placental-blood
banks could help relieve it.25 This seems to be the
most responsible way for this new field to develop.
The for-profit model only encourages the market
view of medicine as a consumer good. That anyone
actually purchases this type of “biologic insurance”
illustrates the fact that there is virtually no limit to
the amount of money some people will pay for a
chance to increase the odds that they or their chil-
dren might live longer. People long for immortality.
As a product that promises a longer life, medicine
has no price limit.
DeLillo would probably be pleased by this new
choice and the longing for security and good health
that it represents. But he might also remind us (and
the new parents, the new companies, and the placen-
tal-blood researchers) that “most of our longings go
unfulfilled. This is the word’s wistful implication —
a desire for something lost or fled or otherwise out
of reach.”1
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